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Abstract 
This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether people’s preferences 
change to become more alike. Such preference conformism would be worrying for an 
economics that takes individual preferences as given (‘de gustibus es non 
disputandum’). So the test is important. But it is also difficult. People can behave 
alike for many reasons and the key to the design of our test, therefore, is the control of 
the other possible reasons for observing apparent peer effects. We find evidence of 
preference conformism in the aggregate and at the individual level (where there is 
heterogeneity). It appears also to be more consistent with Festinger’s epistemic 
account of why it might occur than that of Social Identity Theory.  
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“Sane people did what their neighbors did, so that if any lunatics were at large, one might 
know and avoid them.” 
 (George Eliot, Middlemarch, p.7, chapter 1, iBook edition) 
  
“ … the mind itself is bowed to the yoke; even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is 
the first thing thought of…. The human capacities are withered and starved.” 
 (J.S. Mill, On Liberty, p.105, iBook edition) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
By suggesting in Middlemarch that people conform to the behavior of their 
own group so as to be able to distinguish themselves from members of other groups, 
George Eliot appears to anticipate Social Identity Theory (see Tajfel and Turner, 
1979, and Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). In so far as such conformism arises because 
people’s preferences become alike, her suggestion is also potentially troubling for 
economics. In welfare economics, for instance, it is the identification of an individual 
with their preferences that makes the Pareto criterion appealing. To the extent that 
individual preferences are endogenous and bend to those of others in some process of 
preference conformism, the appeal of the Pareto criterion is diminished. Likewise in 
both micro and macroeconomics, individual preferences are often taken as the 
bedrock upon which economic modeling proceeds because they are assumed not to 
change: ‘de gustibus non est disputandum’ (see Stigler and Becker, 1977, and Lucas, 
1976).1 This paper is concerned with whether there is evidence that people exhibit 
preference conformism. 
As Social Identity Theory attests, the possibility of motivational conformism 
has long been important in the other social sciences. David Riesman’s famous book 
from the 1950s, The Lonely Crowd, that gained him a place on the front of Time 
magazine, was based on the diagnosis that modern societies, and particularly the US, 
                                                        
1 Of course, there are several models in economics where preferences are not fixed in this sense. They 
have typically been developed to explain behavior that appears anomalous under the standard rational 
choice assumptions: for example, Random Utility models, dual self models, etc.   
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were distinguished by the rise of a conformist attention to one’s peers. In making this 
argument he was developing a point first made by de Tocqueville about the US. 
Hannah Arendt’s equally, if not more, famous book from the 1950s, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, made conformism a part of the explanation of how ordinary people 
were swept along by the rise of the Nazi party. Edward Said’s celebrated late 20th 
century book, Orientalism, turns in part on a similar observation to that of Elliot: that 
individuals identify themselves through the contrast they find (or imagine) with those 
outside their group. Whether preference conformism occurs also matters for some 
evolutionary accounts of group selection. This is because, when individuals conform 
to the behavior of their group, the differences in individual behavior, on which 
selection turns, become the same as those that distinguish groups (see Boehm, 1999). 
If for these reasons, it is important to know whether people exhibit preference 
conformism, it is also difficult. This is because people behave alike for many reasons 
and not just because people’s preferences become alike. People often open their 
umbrellas when it rains - a common event triggers the similarity in behavior without 
any change in preferences. It also pays to do what others do when playing a 
coordination game. Equally people may extract information about the state of the 
world from the actions of others in what proves to be an information cascade yielding 
similarity in behavior (e.g., see Bikhchandani et al 1992). Again, even though such 
cascades can sometimes lead one astray, there is no doubt that it can be rational, in the 
sense of acting upon exogenously given preferences, to be guided by others in this 
way. Individuals may also act alike when they have a preference for status or social 
approval that comes from behaving in accordance with a social norm (see Jones, 
1984, and Bernheim, 1994). A preference for following ‘the fashion’ can have the 
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same effect, as can a social preference like inequality aversion in some settings (see 
Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2015).  
The challenge in testing for preference conformism, therefore, is to 
disentangle these possible ‘untroubling’ sources of similarities in individual behavior. 
This is often difficult (see Angrist, 2014) and explains why we have adopted an 
experimental approach. A suitably designed experiment can, in principle, control for 
the ‘untroubling’ causes of conformism. If conformist behavior is still revealed, then 
it points to the troubling kind of preference conformism. Our experimental design has 
six novel features for this purpose. 
First, we focus on non-strategic decision problems to avoid the possibility that 
any similarity in behavior is triggered by reciprocation.2 There are some experiments 
that examine whether people follow norms in social dilemmas (e.g, see Kimbrough 
and Vostroknutov 2016, Carpenter, 2004, Gachter et al, 2013). Such norm-following 
is potentially relevant because it can be interpreted as social preference conformism. 
However, such behavior is also consistent with a simple form of reciprocation and, to 
avoid this confound, we focus on non-strategic decisions where reciprocation does not 
naturally arise. The use of non-strategic decisions also helps avoid another possible 
confound: the in-group bias in social preferences that has been revealed in social 
dilemmas (e.g. see Chen and Li, 2009, and Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009) might 
also produce apparently conformist behaviours.  
There are some non-strategic decision experiments that examine peer effects. 
Cason and Mui (1998) find that peer information has an effect in a dictator game, but 
this information appears to be a prime for social preferences and not for conformism 
as such. There are also experiments involving choices over independent lotteries, 
                                                        
2 It also avoids the possibility of an apparent preference for coordination arising from subjects playing 
a game where coordination of behavior affects pay-offs beneficially: see Morris and Shin (2002). 
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where there is evidence of peer effects. That is, information about what others have 
chosen (which cannot convey any information about the state of the world) appears to 
influence individual lottery choices (e.g., see Cooper and Rege, 2011, Goeree and 
Yariv, 2015, Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2015, and Gioia, 2017).3 The peer effects are 
mixed in the sense that some subjects follow and some avoid what others do. Those 
who follow typically predominate (although see Corazzini and Greiner, 2007, where 
non-conformists predominate, and Duffy et al., 2015, who find that, when subjects 
must choose private or social information and the optimal choice varies, there is a 
balance between the ‘lone wolves’, who err on the side of private, and the, ‘herders’, 
who err on the side of social information). When people follow what others do in 
these experiments it could be because they have a preference for sharing in misery or 
inequality aversion rather than because they have some tendency to preference 
conformism. The evidence on this is again mixed. While Corazzini and Greiner 
(2007) and Goeree and Yariv (2015) reject the inequality aversion interpretation, 
Cooper and Rege (2011) find support for the sharing in misery interpretation (what 
they refer to as a form of ‘social regret’ motivation) but Gioia (2017) rejects this 
possibility.4 Our next feature is a response to this ambiguity over interpretation. 
                                                        
3 There are also several experiments that examine the influence of such social information where it can 
contain information about the state of the world that is relevant for pay-offs: see Anderson and Holt 
(1997) and Weizsacker, 2010. Hung and Plott (2001) develop these information cascade experiments 
by considering 3 different institutional settings. One is the standard individual reward, another is a 
majoritarian reward and the final one is a conformist reward structure. They suggest that the fact that 
behaviour is different across these settings rules out preference conformism. Since the different 
incentives supplied by the different institutional settings clearly influence behaviour, then a simple 
model of preference conformism would be difficult to uphold. But this does not tell against some 
influence from preference conformism and the experiment highlights the difficulty of disentangling 
preference conformism from information transmission when both are in play. 
4  In psychology conformism experiments start with Asch’s famous experiments in the 1950s. 
However, as the concept of preference does not play a central role in Psychology few have focused on 
distinguishing preference conformism from conformist behavior that arises for other reasons.  The 
closest to our knowledge is Gino et al (2009), but this is couched in terms of the influence of norms 
rather than preference conformism on behavior.  
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Second, we have a range of different types of non-strategic decision problems. 
In addition to the lottery decisions discussed above, there are dictator-like distribution 
decisions and choices over ordinary goods. This is new and important because social 
regret or inequality aversion might apply to one type of problem, but it would not 
obviously apply to all problems. Thus if we find that individuals exhibit conformism 
across all types of decision problem, then, on Ockham’s Razor grounds, it is more 
likely that that they have a general tendency towards preference conformism rather 
than several idiosyncratic preferences which explain their conformism across all types 
of decision problem.  
Third, the decision problems are chosen so that the value of the options do not 
depend in any obvious way on a state of nature that might be revealed by other 
people’s decisions. This avoids the possibility that behavior follows an information 
cascade. 
Fourth, we only give individuals peer group information in the form of what 
someone in their group has done in the past. This avoids peer information being 
developed endogenously within the laboratory and so gives control. It also reduces the 
possibility that decision-specific preferences like social regret and inequality aversion 
might be triggered because the peer information refers only to ‘one person’. The peer 
information is in this sense weak. The next design feature adds to the slightness of the 
group information and so contributes, with this feature, to making this a ‘tough’, in 
Popper’s sense, test of preference conformism.5 
Fifth, we assign individuals to either the ‘red group’ or ‘blue group’ (e.g. see 
Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009).  The groups are artificial and this is likely to 
weaken any influence that they have on individual behavior. It also means that the 
                                                        
5 ‘Tough’ in the sense that it increases the likelihood that the hypothesis of preference conformism will 
be falsified. 
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likelihood of subjects drawing in an habitual manner on a desire for social approval or 
status from behaving in accordance with a social norm that might come from 
membership of the same natural group outside the laboratory is much weaker. There 
are, for instance, no ‘red group membership’ habits outside the lab that might be 
drawn upon unconsciously inside. 
Six, individual decisions remain private. This militates against the generation 
of any feelings of social approval or status within the lab because they depend on 
others knowing about your actions (although you may still derive a sense of self-
image). 
The two group feature of our design is also noteworthy in two respects. It 
allows us to test for whether any influence of peer information on behavior in the lab 
arises through an experimental demand effect. We explain this in more detail below. 
The feature also enables us to distinguish between two accounts of preference 
conformism in psychology. In Social Identity Theory, it may seem puzzling that 
individuals gain a sense of identity by acting like other members of their group, but 
not when there is more than one group and groups behave differently. Individuals 
acquire a distinct (social) identity through the differences in the way that groups 
behave. As a result, individuals not only pay heed to what others in their group are 
doing, they also take a cue on how to behave from those outside the group by 
avoiding in some degree what they do (see Gino et al., 2009, for experimental support 
and, from popular culture, Dr Seuss’s ‘Sneetches’). Against this view, Festinger 
(1954) interprets the attention to what others do differently: its origins are epistemic 
and come from an individual drive to evaluate one’s uncertain opinions (and 
abilities). We call this ‘cognitive appraisal’. It arises when a gap between one’s own 
tentative opinion/tastes and that of others suggests a possible incorrectness or 
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weakness in them which leads one to revise them in the direction of what others 
value. He argues, on the basis of a variety of experiments, that the strength of this 
social influence depends on the strength of a person’s ties to their group. Thus what 
people in another group do would be less relevant than that of one’s own group, but 
unlike Social Identity theory, their behavior would not be a cause for doing different.6 
In the next section, we describe the experiment in more detail and set out the 
hypotheses that we test. Section 3 gives our results. We find evidence of preference 
conformism in the aggregate and at an individual level (and in the latter there appears 
to be heterogeneity). While a part of this may be the result of a demand effect, it 
cannot be wholly attributed to such an effect; and the evidence tends to support 
Festinger’s account of why such conformism might occur. Section 4 discusses these 
results and concludes that Mill on liberty, who also worried about the prospect of 
conformism (see quote above), might be a better source, at least in welfare economics, 
for framing policy interventions once preference satisfaction loses some of its 
attraction. 
 
2. Experimental design and hypotheses 
Individuals came to the laboratory and were told that they would be making 
the same set of decisions in two stages. Instructions about the second stage were 
presented only after the conclusion of the first stage. There were 9 separate Decisions, 
as set out in Table 1. In each case there are 5 options and the individual had to choose 
one. The first 3 Decisions are simple choices over objects. Two of these refer to 
familiar objects (flowers and drinks) and one contains unfamiliar ones, the selection 
of a country from countries, mainly the eastern provinces of the old Soviet Union, 
                                                        
6 Satayanath et al.’s, 2016, evidence on Nazi support growing fastest in cities with the densest networks 
of clubs and societies would seem to be consistent with the Festinger view. 
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ending in ‘tan’. We refer to these as the ‘label’ decisions. The next two problems are 
allocation, dictator-like decisions. With two commonly identified social preferences 
for efficiency and inequality aversion, the options in Decision 5 can be ranked 
(efficiency is the same but the degree of inequality changes), but the options in 
Decision 4 cannot be ranked in general if both considerations are in play (because 
there are changes in efficiency and inequality). The final 4 Decisions refer to risky 
options: they are the lottery decisions. The options in the last two can be ranked 
according to their risk.  
[Table 1] 
In the first stage, subjects were allocated to either a Red or a Blue group and 
have to choose one option in these 9 Decisions. In the second stage, subjects made the 
same 9 Decisions (in the same order) on five occasions (i.e., they made choices in 
each Decision five times consecutively). They also received information about what 
others had chosen. Treatments are distinguished according to this information as 
follows. 
• Treatment 0 (Baseline) =  no peer group information 
• Treatment 1 = information on a person’s choice from own group in the past  
• Treatment 2 = information on a person’s choice from the other group in the 
past 
• Treatment 3 = information on a person’s choice from both groups in the past 
In Treatments 1, 2 and 3, the information about own or other group choice was 
phrased on the screen as ‘someone in your group chose….’. We call this the own and 
other peer signal and we identify a conformist peer effect when the likelihood of an 
individual choosing an object is increased by an own peer signal of that object. 
Treatments 1 and 3 supply own peer signals and so provide a test for this effect.  
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We selected two signals (one for each ‘own’ group signal) on the basis of how 
people chose in each group in Treatment 0. In particular, in the Decisions that cannot 
be ranked (1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7), we selected the two options that were chosen with the 
smallest frequency. In the Decisions that can be ranked (5, 8 and 9) we selected the 
two with the biggest distance between them subject to the constraint that both were 
selected less than 25% of the time. In other words, we aim to have signals in the 
Treatments 1-3 that are rarely selected in Treatment 0 ensuring that any resulting 
effect of conformism should be ‘surprising’ given the individual choices. The two 
signals thus selected were randomly assigned: i.e. one to each group as their ‘own 
‘signal (see note below Table 1 for details and online Appendix for a screenshot of 
how signals are presented to subjects). 
Treatment 0 is also important for our test for the influence of these peer 
signals in Treatments 1-3 because it provides a control for any systematic changes in 
decision making that arise from the mere fact of repetition and which could give the 
appearance of a peer effect. Cooper and Rege (2011), for example, find that there is a 
reversion to the mean in their experiment with the result that choices naturally 
gravitate upon repetition towards the average of what has been observed in the past. 
Hypothesis 1a follows.  
H1a (peer effects): After controlling for any change due to repetition, 
individuals tend to follow their own peer signal.   
Any such tendency in the choices that we observe could arise either because 
all individuals have such a (possibly random) tendency to follow others or because 
some individuals have such a tendency.  Hypothesis 1b follows. 
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H1b (individual consistency in peer effects): After controlling for any 
change due to repetition, individuals who follow their own peer signal on one 
or some Decision(s) are more likely to follow their own peer signal on the 
other Decisions. 
The scope for subjects to make judgments regarding status and social approval 
seem more likely in Decisions where the choices can be ranked because distance 
between options can be meaningfully measured. Thus, in so far as we have not 
entirely eliminated the possible influence of a preference for status/social approval 
through the private nature of the decisions and the artificial creation of groups, we 
would expect if such preferences are in play, the peer effects will be stronger in these 
problems. H1c follows. 
H1c (social status/approval peer effects): After controlling for any change 
due to repetition, individuals are more likely to follow their own peer signal in 
Decisions where choices can be ranked. 
If a peer influence is revealed in the test of H1, then it could arise from a 
‘demand effect’: the subjects could follow the signal regarding what others do, not 
because it is what others do, but in response to the fact that this is a signal from those 
who have designed the experiment. To test for this possibility, we compare the ‘peer’ 
effect in Treatment 1 with that in Treatment 2. There is a single signal from the 
experimenter in both cases and if this is all that matters, then we should expect a 
similar effect on behavior. If however, it is the peer group aspect of the signal that 
matters, then we expect the influence to be stronger when it comes from own group 
(Treatment1) than from the other group (Treatment 2). 
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H2 (demand effects only): After controlling for any change due to repetition, 
the peer effect is the same in Treatment 1 as in Treatment 2. 
The next two hypotheses concern two views on the origins of conformist 
preferences and we test them using Treatment 2 and 3 where there are other group 
signals. 
H3 (Social Identity Theory): After controlling for any change due to 
repetition, individuals tend to avoid the other group signal (i.e. choose it less 
frequently). 
H4 (Cognitive appraisal):  After controlling for any change due to repetition, 
individuals tend to follow other group signal but less frequently than their own 
group signal.  
Experiment was conducted at the Economic Science Institute laboratory of the 
Chapman University. 60 subjects drawn from the general student population were 
randomly allocated to each one of our four treatments (Total 240 subjects). Before 
each stage, subjects read the corresponding instructions on their screen (see Appendix 
A). In each session, subjects are randomly assigned to one of four orders of the 
Decision sequence. These were predefined and drawn randomly at the time of the 
experiment (see online Appendix). Subjects were assigned randomly to either the 
Red/Blue group. Within each Decision, options were presented in a row and positions 
were randomized across periods and subjects. 
Decisions 1-3 (labels) were incentivized weakly (in a gift exchange manner) 
with a fixed payment of 10 ECUs. In Decisions 4-5 (dictator), subjects retained the 
number of ECUs that they did not allocate to the other person and the ECUs they were 
allocated as recipient. In Decisions 6-9 (lottery), subjects received the amount of 
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ECUs resulting from a computerized random draw in their chosen lottery. Every 
choice was paid in ECUs at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate of dollars to 
ECUs was $1 = 75 ECUs. Subjects made an average of $15 (including $7 as show up 
fee) for an average of 40 minutes of experiment. This means that the pay-off from any 
individual choice, while non-zero, is modest. These modest pay-offs together with 
repetitions could encourage portfolio effects with individuals spreading choices. This 
would produce changes between Stage 1 and 2, but there would be no pattern of 
conformism in them.   
 
3. Results 
We first check for possible order, position and colour effects. Subjects faced 
Decisions in one of four different orders. A chi-square test rejects at the 5% level the 
null hypothesis that the frequency of a particular option is the same across orders in 
only 7 out of 45 possible cases (so, the tests cannot reject the null that frequencies are 
the same across the different orders in 38 out of 45 cases). Thus, there seem to be no 
systematic order effects. It is possible that the position of the options has an effect 
(e.g., subjects tend to choose the option on the far left). A chi-square test pooling data 
across subjects and Decisions does not reject at the 5% level the null hypothesis that 
the frequency of individual choices is the same across positions (p-value: 0.482).7  
Thus, there seem to be no systematic position effects. Subjects drawn from the same 
population are randomly allocated to either a Red or a Blue group. For each Decision 
in the first stage, a chi-square test rejects at the 5% the null hypothesis that individual 
                                                        
7 We pool data across subjects and Decisions to address concerns of power associated to the chi-square 
test. For each Decision, we also fail to reject the null hypothesis that subjects’ distribution of choices 
does not depend on the position when using Friedman tests. Every p-value is equal to 1.  
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choices are the same across groups in 1 out of 9 cases (Decision 6).8 Thus, there seem 
to be no systematic effects associated with Red versus Blue. Finally, there should be 
no difference across treatments in terms of choices in the first stage. For each 
Decision, we compare the distributions of the four treatments and a chi-square test 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that choices are not different across treatments in 9 
out of 9 Decisions. 
We turn now to the test of our 4 hypotheses. 
Table 2 gives the mean number of times (out of 5) with which subjects in 
different Treatments follow their ‘own group signal’ and ‘the other group signal’. In 
Treatment 0 subjects are not provided with this information, we provide it here for the 
purposes of comparison with the other Treatments. So, for example in Decision 3, 
subjects in the second stage of Treatment 0 actually choose the item that we used as 
an own group signal in Treatment 1 less than would be expected by chance (and 
average 0.82 times out or 5); whereas in Treatment 1 where they receive this signal 
they choose the item more frequently than you would expect by chance (an average of 
1.72 times out of 5). A Mann Whitney test compares the mean frequency of 
‘following own’ and ‘following other’ in stage 2 of Treatments 1-3 with the control 
frequencies of the choice of these options in Treatment 0 (that is when choices occur 
for entirely personal idiosyncratic or random reasons because there is no information 
about what any other subject’s behavior). 
[Table 2] 
Two things are apparent in these overall tendencies. First, there is always a 
tendency to follow ‘own signal’ in Treatment 1 (as compared with Treatment 0 
                                                        
8 A similar battery of tests is done for choices in the second stage of treatment 0, where no information 
is provided and thus choices between Red and Blue should still come from the same distribution. Only 
1 comparison out 45 is significant at 5%. 
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choices) and this is significant at 5% or better except for Decision 2 where it is not 
significant and Decisions 1 and  6 where it is significant at only 10% level. This 
counts in favor of H1a. The same tendency can be found in Treatment 3, but it is 
statistically weaker (we pick up on the fact that it is weaker when discussing Result 
5). Against, H1c and the influence of status and social approval, the Decisions that 
can be ranked (5, 8 and 9) do not appear to have stronger peer effects than the other 
Decisions in either a quantitative or statistical significance sense.  
These statistical tests on the aggregate data are potentially subject to a multiple 
hypothesis testing critique. As a result, we reproduce the analysis in Table 3 at the 
level of type of Decision (label, dictator and lottery). The same pattern emerges. The 
frequency of following ‘own signal’ is statistically significantly higher in Treatment 1 
than the choice of the same options in Treatment 0 in each Decision type; and these 
differences are still statistically significant after the conservative Bonferroni 
adjustment of the test statistic for multiple hypothesis testing.9 
     [Table 3]  
We now turn to the evidence on these points from individual random effect 
Poisson regressions in Table 4. In these regressions, we consider the possible 
influences on the count of an individual ‘following own’ signal and ‘following other’ 
signal for a given Decision. In each case there are several specifications. They share a 
control for the initial choice in stage 1 (whether it coincided with ‘own signal’ or 
‘other’ signal), dummies for each Treatment and dummies for Decision types.  
[Table 4] 
                                                        
9 When the conservative Bonferroni adjustment to the comparison between Treatment 1 and Treatment 
0 is made to the original 9 decisions, 4 remain significantly different. Alternatively a frequentist might 
expect 1 false positive in the 9.  
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First, we note, in favour of H1a that the coefficients on Treatment 1 dummy 
and Treatment 3 dummy (where there are own group signals) are positive and 
significant in the ‘follow own’ signal equations. The sizes of the coefficients are also 
interesting. It is bigger in Treatment 1 than Treatment 3, where they are respectively 
70% and 50% of the size of the coefficient on initial choice. The effect of conformity 
in this sense may be smaller in both cases than the influence of consistency coming 
from ‘initial choice’, but, with 50-70% of the influence of consistency, these 
conformity effects are quantitatively non-trivial. (Again we pick up on the fact that 
the own group effect appears weaker in Treatment 3 than Treatment 1 below.) 
Second, there is weak evidence in favor of H1c as the dummy for the ranked 
Decisions is positive and significant at a 10% level.10 
Result 1 (consistent with H1a): Individuals are more likely to choose an 
object when they know a member of their own group has done so in the past. 
Result 2 (mixed in relation to H1c): There is only weak evidence in 
individual regressions and none in the aggregate data that following own 
signal is more likely in Decisions where the options can be ranked.  
Turning to H1b, we classify a subject as a ‘follower’ in a Decision in 
Treatment 1 if they follow their own group signal when they did not initially choose 
this option, on at least half occasions that they encountered this Decision with the 
                                                        
10 The count structure of our data (i.e. the number of times that an individual chooses a particular signal 
within a given Decision) leads naturally to the use of the Poisson regression. To address concerns about 
the appropriateness of the Poisson distribution, we check for the robustness by re-estimating the 
equations in Table 4 using each individual choice as the unit of observation and an OLS specification 
(clustered at the individual level). They are in online Appendix, Table B2. The results are qualitatively 
the same with this form estimation both here and in relation to the later results. One advantage of the 
OLS estimation is that it permits a test for time trends within a Decision in the influence of ‘own’ and 
‘other’ group signals. There are no significant differences between the first and subsequent repetitions. 
This appears consistent with Gioia (2017). As a further robustness check, we also present in online 
Appendix, Table B3 the same analysis but only with the first repetition within a Decision (before any 
time trend is possible). The results are qualitatively the same. We thank an anonymous referee for these 
observations.   
16 
 
signal. We now use this individual Decision determination to create a ‘follower’ index 
for each type of Decision (Label, Dictator, Lottery): it is given by the proportion of 
Decisions in that type of Decision that the person is classified as a ‘follower’ (e.g. for 
Labels, the index takes on 0, 0.33, 0.67 or 1 as there are 3 Decisions). We now test 
H1b by considering whether knowing this ‘follower’ index for one type of Decision 
helps predict a subject’s propensity to follow the own group signal in the other types 
of Decision.  
We do this by entering the ‘follower’ index as an explanatory variable in the 
regression in Table 5 on the individual frequency of following own group signal, 
along the lines of the earlier individual regressions in Table 4, except we now drop the 
observations from the Decisions that we have used to calculate the Follower index. As 
it helps in addressing the next hypothesis, we can do the same for the subjects in 
Treatment 2 to construct a ‘follower’ index of the ‘other group’ signal and we can 
include them in this regression and allow for a possible difference in frequency and 
the influence of the ‘follower’ index by a Treatment dummy that takes a value of 1 (0) 
for Treatment 1 (2). Table 5 gives the results (column 1 tests for the influence of the 
Label ‘follower’ index on the other decisions, column 2 for the influence of the 
Dictator ‘follower’ index, etc). The FollowerLabel, FollowerDictator and 
FollowerLottery by themselves are negative but not significant. The interaction with 
the variable treatment presents positive coefficients (and similar magnitude to the 
coefficient on the control for Initial choice) but it is only significant for the 
FollowerLottery. When we test for whether the sum of the Follower and the Follower 
interacted with the Treatment dummy are significantly different from zero, we find 
that the p-values are 0.1778, 0.0349 and 0.0545 for FollowerLabel, FollowerDictator 
and FollowerLottery, respectively. This means, with these definitions, that the extent 
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to which a person is a ‘follower’ in Treatment 1 in either the dictator or lottery type of 
Decision in Treatment 1 helps predict (positively) their frequency of following the 
own group signal in the other Decisions in Treatment 1. However, it is not helpful in 
predicting decisions in Lottery or Dictator decisions to know the extent to which a 
subject is a ‘follower’ in Label decisions. In contrast in Treatment 2, none of the 
follower indices are themselves significantly different from zero (i.e., they only 
become significant when interacted with the Treatment dummy). 
[Table 5] 
 
The assumption concerning who is a follower in the construction of our 
Follower index is, of course, arbitrary and so these results are only illustrative. 
However we check for their robustness in two ways. First, we select a Decision at 
random for each subject and apply the same rule to classify that person as a ‘follower’ 
or not. In an analogous fashion, we then examined whether this classification helped 
predict the frequency of following the own group signal in the remaining 8 Decisions. 
The precise results depend on the original random selection of the Decision for the 
classification, but we report a typical result in the online Appendix (Table B4). The 
coefficient on ‘follower’ is again significant and roughly 55% of the size of the 
coefficient on the influence of an initial choice of this object. Second, we re-estimate 
equation 5 using OLS with clustered errors at the individual level. The results are 
stronger in terms of the predictive power of all three Follower variables in Treatment 
1 Decisions and are reported in online Appendix (Table B5).  
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Result 3 (consistent with H1b): Knowing that a subject is a ‘follower’ in 
either dictator or lottery Decisions in Treatment 1 helps to predict their 
likelihood of following their own group signal in the other Decisions. 
Before we turn to the remaining hypotheses, we explore tentatively what 
conformism looks like in our sample in Treatment 1 where the evidence of following 
the own group signal is strongest. First, how many conformists are there? Suppose we 
use our ‘follower’ classification in each Decision and adopt some plausible cut-off 
number of Decisions where being a ‘follower’ makes you a ‘conformist’. Suppose, for 
instance, we define a ‘conformist’, for this purpose, as someone who is a ‘follower’ 
on at least 4 of the Decisions.11 There were 23 who followed the own group signal 
with at least this frequency, but we exclude 7 of these subjects from being ‘followers’ 
on our definition because they also chose their own group signal initially. Our test 
does not allow us to distinguish whether their behavior reflects consistency or 
‘following’. Thus there are 16 clear, with this definition, ‘conformists’ in our sample 
of 53 where the test can distinguish (or possibly a maximum number of 23 from the 
sample of 60, if we put all 7 into the sample as conformists). In other words, anything 
between 25% and 40% our population could be ‘conformist’. Of course, the definition 
is arbitrary. But it is not implausible and the numbers showing these ‘signs’ of 
conformism are non-trivial: they are not a small fringe even if they are in a minority.  
Second, what are the characteristics of the conformists? One way of answering 
this is to develop an analogous definition of  ‘consistent’ choice to identify people 
who show similar ‘signs’ but this time of ‘consistent’ choice: in this instance, they 
follow their initial choice at least twice on at least 4 Decisions. 41 of our subjects are 
                                                        
11 Table B6 in the online Appendix shows how sensitive these numbers of conformists are to changes 
in the parameter defining follower and the parameter for the number of decisions where a subject is a 
follower that qualifies them for the title of ‘conformist’.  
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‘consistent’ in this sense. These definitions of ‘conformist’ and ‘consistent’ are, of 
course, illustrative but they are interesting because they allow for overlap. So, people 
could both show signs of ‘conformism’ and ‘consistent’ choice under them. Indeed, 
12 of our 16 subjects who show ‘signs’ of ‘conformism’ also show ‘signs’ of 
‘consistent’ choice. In other words, most of the ‘conformists’ also shows signs of 
what from the point of economics looks likely perfectly normal behavior. They are 
not otherwise erratic choosers.12 This is one way of thinking about whether Arendt’s 
conjecture that many, otherwise ordinary people are prone to conformism.  
Alternatively, we could use our ‘follower’ indices as the measure of 
conformism and see whether individual differences in the value of these indices are 
related to gender or attitudes to risk and inequality. We have measures of the latter 
attitudes from stage 1 choices in Decisions 4, 5, 8 and 9.  None of these individual 
controls was significant (see Table B7 in the online Appendix). In this sense, there is 
no obvious individual characteristic associated with conformism in our sample. 
Our next result concerns the relative influence of the ‘own group’ as compared 
to the ‘other group’ signal. We first present the supporting evidence for the substance 
of this result on the relative influence and then comment on the interpretation of this 
evidence in relation to H2 (i.e. the hypothesis that what we have observed in Result 1 
is due to a demand effect).  
In the aggregate data of Table 2 and 3, there is evidence that individuals also 
follow the other group’s signal in Treatment 2 when this is the only signal: that is, the 
frequency of ‘following other’ increases between Treatment 0 and Treatment 2. 
However, this is a weaker effect than the one reported in support of Result 1 on the 
own group signal in Treatment 1. The difference in the Treatment 2 as compared with 
                                                        
12  The proportion of conformists who choose consistently (12/16) is not statistically significantly 
different (p-value: 0.8114) from the proportion of those who are not conformists who choose 
consistently on these definitions (29/37).  
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Treatment 0 is only statistically significant in 3 Decisions (and one at 10% levels) in 
Table 2 and one type of Decision in Table 3. This compares with the much stronger 
evidence on following ‘own group’ signal in the aggregate data in Treatment 1, noted 
above.  
The individual regressions in Table 4 also support this difference. The 
coefficient on Treatment 2 dummy in the ‘follow other’ signal equation is positive 
and significant in Table 4, but it is smaller than the analogous coefficient from 
Treatment 1 on the influence of the ‘own group’ signal  and this difference is 
statistically significant (p-values: 0.0495 in (1) and 0.0192 in (2)).  Further in 
Treatment 3 where the subjects receive both signals, the coefficient on ‘follow own’ is 
positive and significantly different from 0; whereas the coefficient on ‘follow other’ is 
not significant. Again, the ‘own group’ effect is more powerful than the ‘other group’ 
signal. The final piece of evidence on the difference in behavior in relation to own and 
other group signals comes from Table 5 (and is summarized in Result 3). Following 
own group signal can be useful in predicting future behavior in Treatment 1 but 
following the other group signal is not useful in Treatment 2.  
We state that Result 4 tells against H2. This is for the following reasons. The 
evidence of following the other group signal in Treatment 2 is consistent with a 
demand effect because subjects could be responding to a piece of information 
provided by the experimenter. It is also consistent with the Festinger’s Cognitive 
appraisal hypothesis because, on this account, subjects will treat other group 
information as potentially indicative of what to do. Accordingly, the evidence from 
Treatment 2 might be thought at best to set an upper bound for the demand effect. 
Consequently, if the influence of the own group signal in Treatment 1 exceeds that of 
the other group signal in Treatment, the tendency to conformism in Treatment 1 
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cannot be entirely explained by a putative demand effect. We arrive at the same 
conclusion when we consider the evidence on individual behavior in Treatment 3 
given in Table 4. Treatment 3 is the least likely to produce a demand effect because 
the experimenter here provides two opposing pieces of information. In this sense, 
there is no clear lead or prompt from the experimenter through the experimental 
design. If, as we find, subjects follow the own signal but not the other signal in these 
circumstances, it suggests that they find the own signal more salient for reasons other 
than mere experimental suggestion because this applies equally to the other group 
signal. 
Result 4 (against H2): Subjects are more likely to follow ‘own’ signals than 
‘other’ group signals.  
Our final result concerns the direction of the influence from the other group 
signal. To summarise the evidence that has already been presented on this in support 
Result 4, it is never significant and negative. It is either positive and significant in 
Treatment 2 or insignificant in Treatment 3. In short, there is no evidence that subjects 
avoid the other group signal (as in H3) and some evidence that they are influenced in 
the manner suggested by H4. 
 The key to the interpretation of this Result, however, in relation to H3 and H4 
is whether the positive effect of the other group signal in Treatment 2 is wholly a 
demand effect. If it is not and there is some genuine following of the other group 
signal, then this counts against H3 but is consistent with H4. On the other hand, if the 
positive effect in Treatment 2 is entirely a demand effect, then this evidence neither 
tells in favor nor against H3 and likewise H4 (because it is just a demand effect).  
To help resolve this question, it is potentially helpful to look across all three 
treatments for a measure of congruence between the results of each.  We have already 
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noted that the coefficient on ‘follow other’ in Treatment 2 in Table 4 is significantly 
smaller than that own ‘follow own’ in Treatment 1. This difference, if we assume for 
this purpose that the ‘follow other’ influence arises wholly from a demand effect, 
captures the genuine influence of conformism. This suggests an influence of 
conformism in Treatment 1 equal to c.0.25 or c.20% of the effect that comes from the 
‘initial choice’ control. However, in Treatment 3 where demand effects are much less 
likely, the size of the coefficient on ‘follow own’ is around 0.5 or 50% of the 
influence from the ‘initial choice’ control. This higher figure for the genuine 
conformist influence of the own group in Treatment 3 suggests that the ‘follow other’ 
coefficient in Treatment 2 cannot be wholly a consequence of a demand effect (i.e. we 
need to subtract something less than 0.5, the whole Treatment 2 coefficient, from the 
Treatment 1 coefficient to get a residual equal to 0.5 for the genuine conformist effect 
suggested in Treatment 3). To be specific, a demand effect equivalent to c.0.2 on the 
coefficient in Treatment 1 would yield a similar residual coefficient for the genuine 
influence of conformism in this Treatment to that found in Treatment 3 (i.e. 0.5). But 
if c.0.2 on the coefficient captures the demand effect, this leaves 0.3 on the Treatment 
2 coefficient as genuine following of this signal.13 For this reason, we conclude that 
this Result, although not decisive, mildly favours H4 over H3.14 
                                                        
13 It is difficult to directly compare these back of the envelope calculations with the evidence on 
conformism in other studies because of the differences in design. Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2015, 
provide the closest comparator where 33% of subjects change their choice when they know what their 
peers have done in one Treatment and 18% in another. Our analogous figure for those who did not 
choose the own signal option in stage 1 of Treatment 1 (this happened on 444 occasions) and who then 
chose their own signal option in the first decision of stage 2 was 105: i.e. 24% which is within the 
range of the Lahno and Serra-Garcia experiment.  (The contrast in our experiment with the same 
behaviour in Treatment 0 is instructive. This occurs on 43 out 459 choices and this is statistically 
significantly different to the figure in Treatment 1 (p-value=0.000).) 
14 If we define someone who chooses the other signal in stage 1 of Treatment 2 (this happens on 66 
occasions) and avoids this option in the first decision of Stage 2 as behaving in a manner consistent 
with social identity theory, then there are 26 such cases. This compares with the proportion of subjects 
who do the same in Treatment 0 (i.e. when they know nothing about the other signal) of 36 cases out of 
73 occasions when people choose this item in stage 1. This is not statistically significant different from 
the proportion found in Treatment 1 (p-value=0.240). In other words, the instances of this kind of 
social identity consistent behaviour are no more than we find when there are no signals.  
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Result 5 (mildly favouring H4 over H3): Subjects do not avoid other group 
signal. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion  
In what is a ‘tough’ test in Popper’s sense, we find evidence of a peer effect on 
behavior (Result 1). This evidence points to preference conformism because the other 
possible sources of behaving alike are unlikely to be important in these decision tasks. 
For example, it is difficult to be motivated by status and social approval when actions 
remain private; and there is only weak evidence that these peer effects are stronger in 
decision problems that can be ranked where the scope for such sentiments is stronger 
(Result 2).  In addition, we find that individuals’ tendencies to conformism exhibit a 
measure of consistency across the Decisions (Result 3). This is important. The 
evidence of peer effects could have arisen in our experiment because individuals had 
some random propensity to follow the signal of what some other person was doing. 
Indeed, this might be the way that an experimental demand effect would operate. 
However, the evidence on consistency in conformity tells against this. So does the 
direct evidence on demand effects: while there is some evidence that is consistent 
with a demand effect, it is patchy and even if taken at face value, it would not account 
for all the conformism we observe (Result 4).  
Although this is important new evidence for the existence of preference 
conformism, it is perhaps not so surprising. Imitation is a well-known form of 
learning and in other experiments imitation captures a relatively large fraction of 
behaviours (e.g. see Apesteguia et al, 2007). Furthermore, there are evolutionary 
models where preferences are selected because they have survival value: i.e. 
preferences are, in effect, imitated and become endogenous (e.g. see Huck and 
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Oechssler, 1998). Where the decision tasks that people face require equilibrium 
selection or shared social preferences to achieve more efficient outcomes, such a 
process of endogenous preference formation will yield in important respects shared 
preferences: that is, a form of preference conformism (see Bowles and Gintis, 2011). 
In turn, habits of preference imitation that have evolved to solve social dilemmas may 
easily carry over to other types of decision problem. There are also two prominent 
theories in psychology that predict forms of preference conformism. Our evidence 
mildly seems to favour Festinger’s over Social Identity theory. 
Preference conformism is potentially troubling for some parts of economics 
and so these results are important. How troubling, of course, depends on the extent of 
such conformism and the nature of the trouble caused. On the numbers, our 
illustrative basis for classifying subjects as ‘conformists’ is, in this respect, arbitrary 
and so our figure of anything between 25% and 40% could easily change. 
Nevertheless, this way of coming up with a number and the fact that the coefficient in 
the individual regressions on the own group signal is as much as 70% of the size of 
the coefficient on whether someone initially revealed a preference for this object 
when there was no peer information suggests that the magnitude of conformist 
influence is non-trivial.    
What, then, is the nature of the trouble? It is not deeply worrying for positive 
economics because modeling depends on some plausible foundational assumptions 
regarding behavior. What is required for this is some behavioral regularities and not 
that they should be derived from a model of preference satisfaction alone. In this 
respect the evidence from this experiment joins the growing evidence from behavioral 
economics that there are many regularities in behavior that are not (or not easily) 
derivable from the preference satisfaction model; and positive economics should take 
25 
 
this into account. The importance of this paper in this regard is that this particular 
kind of non-rational choice regularity in behavior has not hitherto featured 
significantly in the list of behavioral economic insights.  
The trouble is possibly deeper for welfare economics, however, because the 
appeal of the Pareto criterion depends on taking individual preferences as given. 
There are alternative criteria, however. Sugden (2004) is one example of an attempt to 
define an alternative metric of opportunity and connect this to the operation of 
markets when preferences are not well defined. Another comes from J.S. Mill. He is, 
of course, well known as an interpreter of utilitarianism and this may seem to push 
him in the direction of preference satisfaction, but his most famous work, On Liberty, 
presents an alternative view. In On Liberty, Mill wants to advance a constitution of 
liberty because this enables individuals to acquire their own character - that is, their 
individuality through the exercise of freedom of thought, discussion and ‘experiments 
in living’. He did not wish here to ground policy on satisfying given preferences 
because people’s preferences were naturally something in the making. His policy 
approach, like that of Buchanan (1986) later, is constitutional. Policy should be 
focused on establishing the rules governing outcomes and not the outcomes 
themselves. This, then, is the other respect in which this experiment is important. It is 
an encouragement to thinking more about some of the alternative to Pareto criterion 
approaches to welfare economics. 
Nevertheless, even for constitutionalists like Mill, the evidence from this 
experiment is still worrying. He thought, as the quote at the beginning suggests, that 
conformism was the enemy of the development of individual character. One 
encouraging aspect of the evidence from this experiment in this respect, however, is 
Result 5. It seems that there is stronger evidence for the cognitive or epistemic source 
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of conformism than the Social Identity one. This helps provide a crumb of comfort for 
Mill in our results. He thought that liberty would work against conformity. In so far as 
the exercise of liberty provides diversity, then our results support this conclusion. 
When there is an ‘other group’ as well as the ‘own group’ signal, the ‘own group’ 
signal effect on behavior becomes weaker.  
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Akerlof, G. A. and R. E. Kranton. 2000. “Economics and Identity.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 115(3): 715-53. 
Anderson, L., and C. Holt. 1997. “Information Cascades in the Laboratory.” American 
Economic Review, 87(5): 847-62. 
Angrist, J. D. 2014. “The Perils of Peer Effects.” Labour Economics, 30: 98-108. 
Apesteguia, J, Huck, S., and J. Oechssler. 2007. “Imitation: Theory and Experimental 
Evidence.” Journal of Economic Theory, 136: 217-235. 
Bernheim, B. D. 1994. “A Theory of Conformity.” Journal of Political Economy, 
102(5): 841-877.  
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., and I. Welch. 1992. “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, 
Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades.” Journal of Political 
Economy, 100(5): 992-1026. 
27 
 
Boehm, C. 1999. “Hierarchy in the Forest.” Harvard University Press. 
Bowles, S. and H. Gintis. 2011. A Cooperative Species: Human Recopirocity and its 
Evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Buchanan, J. 1986. “The Constitution of Economic Policy’, American Economic 
Review, 77(3): 243-250.  
Carpenter, J. P. 2004. “When in Rome: Conformity and the Provision of Public 
Goods.” Journal of Socio-Economics, 33(4): 395-408. 
Cason, T. and V-L. Mui. 1998. “Social Influence in the Sequential Dictator Game.” 
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42: 248-65. 
Chen, Y and S. X. Li. 2009. “Group Identity and Social Preferences.” American 
Economic Review, 99(1): 431-457. 
Cooper, D. J. and M. Rege. 2011. “Misery Loves Company: Social Regret and Social 
Interaction Effects in Choices Under Risk and Uncertainty.” Games and Economic 
Behavior, 73(1): 91–110.  
Corazzini, L. and B. Greiner. 2007. “Herding, Social Preferences and (non-) 
Conformity.” Economic Letters, 97(1): 74-80. 
Duffy, J., Hopkins, E. and T. Kornienko. 2015. “Lone Wolf or Herd Animal? An 
Experiment on Choice of Information and Social Learning.” Working Paper UC 
Irvine. 
Festinger, L. 1954. “A Theory of Social Comparison Processes.” Human Relations, 
7(2): 117-140. 
28 
 
Gächter, S., Nosenzo, D. and M. Sefton. 2013. “Peer Effects in Pro-social Behavior: 
Social Norms or Social Preferences?” Journal of the European Economic Association 
11(3): 548–573.   
Gino, F., Ayal, S., and D. Ariely. 2009. “Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical 
Behavior: the Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel.” Psychological Science, 20(3): 
393-398. 
Gioia, F. 2017. “Peer effect on risk behaviour: the importance of group identity.” 
Experimental Economics, 20: 100-129. 
Goeree, J. K. and L. Yariv. 2015. “Conformity in the Lab.” Journal of the Economic 
Science Association, 1(1): 15-28. 
Hargreaves Heap, S. and D.J. Zizzo. 2009. “The Value of Groups.” American 
Economic Review, 99(1): 295-323. 
Huck, S. and J. Oechssler. 1998. “The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining 
fairness allocations.” Games and Economic Behavior, 28(1): 13-24. 
Hung, A.A., and C. R. Plott. 2001. “Information Cascades: Replication and an 
Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions." American 
Economic Review, 91(5): 1508-1520. 
Jones, S. 1984. “The Economics of Conformism.”  Oxford: Blackwell.  
Kimbrough, E. and A. Vostroknutov. 2016. “Norms Make Preferences Social.” 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 14 (3): 608-638. 
29 
 
Lahno, A. M. and M. Serra-Garcia. 2015. “Peer Effects in Risk Taking.” Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 50(1): 73-95. 
Lucas, R. 1976. “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique.” In Brunner, K.; 
Meltzer, A. The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets. Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy 1. New York: American Elsevier. pp. 19–46. 
Morris, S and H.S. Shin. 2002. “Social value of Public Information”, American 
Economic Review, 92(5): 1521-1534. 
Satyanath, S., Voigtlaender, N. and H-J. Voth. “Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital 
and the Rise of the Nazi Party”, Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.  
Stigler, G. J. and G. S. Becker. 1977. “De Gustibus non est Disputandum.” American 
Economic Review, 67(20): 76-90. 
Sugden, R. 2004. "The Opportunity Criterion: Consumer Sovereignty Without the 
Assumption of Coherent Preferences." American Economic Review, 94(4): 1014-
1033. 
Tajfel, H., and J. C. Turner. 1979. “An integrative theory of intergroup conflict.” The 
Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33(47): 74. 
Weizsäcker, G. 2010. “Do We Follow Others when We Should? A Simple Test of 
Rational Expectations.” American Economic Review, 100(5): 2340-2360. 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Table 1: Set of Decisions and options 
Decision Options 
1 SUNFLOWER  TULIP  DAISY  DAFFODIL  ROSE 
2 WINE BEER JUICE COFFEE WATER 
3 BHUTAN UZBEKISTAN KYRGYZSTAN TAJIKISTAN TURKMENISTAN 
4 
 
Me: 10 Me: 9 Me: 8 Me: 7 Me: 6 
Other: 0 Other: 2 Other: 4 Other: 5 Other: 7 
5 
 
Me: 10 Me: 9 Me: 8 Me: 7 Me: 6 
Other: 0 Other: 1 Other: 2 Other: 3 Other: 4 
6 {23,1;0.5,0.5} {16,6;0.6,0.4} {6,26;0.7,0.3} {10,20;0.8,0.2} {13,3;0.9,0.1} 
7 {0,20;0.5,0.5} {4,19;0.6,0.4} {7,17;0.7,0.3} {9,14;0.8,0.2} {11,1;0.9,0.1} 
8 {20,0;0.5,0.5} {18,2;0.5,0.5} {16,4;0.5,0.5} {14,6;0.5,0.5} {12,8;0.5,0.5} 
9 {25,0;0.6,0.4} {23,3;0.6,0.4} {21,6;0.6,0.4} {19,9;0.6,0.4} {17,12;0.6,0.4} 
Note: Signal for Red group are: 1. Daisy, 2. Beer, 3. Kyrgyzstan, 4. {Me: 9; Other: 2}, 5. {Me: 9; 
Other: 1}, 6. {23,1;0.5,0.5}, 7. {4,19;0.6,0.4}, 8. {18,2;0.5,0.5} and 9. {25,0;0.6,0.4}; for Blue 
group are: 1. Daffodil, 2. Coffee, 3. Turkmenistan, 4. {Me: 6; Other: 7}, 5. {Me: 6; Other: 4}, 6. 
{13,3;0.9,0.1}, 7. {11,1;0.9,0.1}, 8. {14,6;0.5,0.5} and 9. {19,9;0.6,0.4}. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average frequency subjects follow own signal 
 
Treatment 0 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
Decision 
own 
option 
other 
option 
Follow own 
signal 
Follow other 
signal 
Follow own 
signal 
Follow other 
signal 
1 
0.50 
(0.748) 
0.57 
(1.095) 
  1.13* 
(1.652) 
0.63 
(1.178) 
0.82 
(1.214) 
0.65 
(1.176) 
2 
0.57 
(0.745) 
0.87 
(1.308) 
1.40 
(1.924) 
0.95 
(1.599) 
      1.72*** 
(1.992) 
      0.45*** 
(1.111) 
3 
0.82 
(1.372) 
0.63 
(1.073) 
       1.70*** 
(1.769) 
1.20 
(1.735) 
1.35 
(1.706) 
0.62 
(0.958) 
4 
0.73 
(1.260) 
0.82 
(1.186) 
       1.62*** 
(1.842) 
1.20 
(1.793) 
  1.30* 
(1.660) 
0.97 
(1.562) 
5 
0.93 
(1.300) 
0.80 
(1.412) 
     1.98** 
(2.071) 
  1.27* 
(1.686) 
1.48 
(1.771) 
0.83 
(1.475) 
6 
0.93 
(1.148) 
0.58 
(0.926) 
   1.57* 
(1.721) 
      1.30*** 
(1.453) 
0.93 
(1.313) 
0.78 
(1.277) 
7 
0.80 
(1.038) 
0.85 
(1.246) 
       1.77*** 
(1.845) 
      1.90*** 
(1.811) 
0.98 
(1.214) 
1.10 
(1.526) 
8 
0.57 
(0.981) 
0.65 
(0.799) 
       1.62*** 
(1.748) 
1.23 
(1.522) 
  0.95* 
(1.320) 
0.92 
(1.344) 
9 
0.73 
(1.056) 
0.66 
(1.145) 
     1.45** 
(1.712) 
1.07 
(1.550) 
1.10 
(1.548) 
1.07 
(1.593) 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3: Average frequency subjects follow own and others’ signal 
Decision Type 
Treatment 0 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
own 
option 
other 
option 
Follow own 
signal 
Follow other 
signal 
Follow own 
signal 
Follow other 
signal 
Labels 
0.63 
(0.653) 
0.69 
(0.691) 
1.41*** 
(1.208) 
0.93 
(1.054) 
      1.29*** 
(1.225) 
0.57 
(0.592) 
Dictator Games 
0.83 
(1.111) 
0.81 
(1.154) 
1.80*** 
(1.737) 
1.23 
(1.533) 
1.39 
(1.605) 
0.9 
(1.340) 
Lotteries 
0.76 
(0.605) 
0.69 
(0.624) 
1.60*** 
(1.175) 
       1.37*** 
(1.135) 
0.99 
(0.861) 
0.97 
(1.015) 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Following their own and others’ signal 
 Follow own signal Follow other signal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Initial 1.115*** 1.064*** 1.267*** 1.204*** 
 (0.048) (0.113) (0.056) (0.116) 
     
Treatment 1 0.732*** 0.793*** -0.481*** -0.766*** 
 (0.112) (0.120) (0.151) (0.167) 
     
Treatment 2 -0.194 -0.514*** 0.499*** 0.536*** 
 (0.120) (0.138) (0.141) (0.146) 
     
Treatment 3 0.521*** 0.529*** 0.0456 0.0553 
 (0.113) (0.121) (0.145) (0.152) 
     
Ranked 0.085 0.094* -0.050 -0.053 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.059) (0.059) 
     
Order 0.0058 0.0070 0.00404 0.00497 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Lottery type -0.0776 -0.0776 0.177*** 0.187*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.065) (0.065) 
     
Dictator type -0.0157 -0.00328 0.226*** 0.232*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.073) (0.073) 
     
Initial* Treatment 1  -0.167  0.707*** 
  (0.136)  (0.180) 
     
Initial*Treatment 2  0.815***  -0.146 
  (0.165)  (0.152) 
     
Initial*Treatment 3  -0.038  -0.032 
  (0.146)  (0.160) 
     
Constant -0.621*** -0.616*** -0.927*** -0.915*** 
 (0.102) (0.106) (0.122) (0.127) 
Observations 2160 2160 2160 2160 
# Subjects 240 240 240 240 
Dep. variable: Number of times signal is followed within a Decision. Each 
Decision is one observation. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. The variable ‘Initial’ is a control when the signal was 
selected in Stage 1, the dummy variable ‘Treatment #’ indicates treatment, 
the dummy variable ‘Ranked’ indicates if the options in the decision 
problem could be ranked, the variable ‘Order’ indicates the order of the 
decision problems and the variables ‘Lottery type’ and ‘Dictator type’ 
indicates whether the decision concerns lotteries or allocations, 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Follow signal in Treatments 1 and 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Initial 0.721*** 0.976*** 1.060*** 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.092) 
    
Treatment 0.042 0.014 -0.012 
 (0.173) (0.152) (0.194) 
    
FollowerLabel -0.092   
 (0.624)   
    
Treat*FollowerLabel 0.556   
 (0.707)   
    
FollowerDictator  -0.292  
  (0.477)  
    
Treat*FollowerDictator  0.767  
  (0.531)  
    
FollowerLottery   -1.056 
   (0.754) 
    
Treat*FollowerLottery   1.751** 
   (0.836) 
    
Ranked Decisions -0.045 0.071 0.155* 
 (0.062) (0.067) (0.085) 
    
Order 0.031*** -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
    
Female 0.181 0.123 0.108 
 (0.147) (0.132) (0.153) 
    
Constant -0.109 -0.087 -0.159 
 (0.164) (0.148) (0.174) 
Observations 720 840 600 
Dep. variable: Number of times signal is followed in a given task. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The variables ‘FollowerLabel’, 
‘FollowerDictator’ and ‘FollowerLottery’ give the proportion of tasks in that category 
for which the subjects is classified as a ‘follower’.  
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Appendix A: Instructions 
 
FIRST STAGE 
 
Thanks for taking part in this experiment. You are not allowed to communicate during 
the experiment. If you have any question at any point, raise your hand and the 
experimenter will come to your desk (next to this screen). 
 
Everyone in this room has been assigned evenly assigned into two groups: the 
#group1# GROUP and the #group2# GROUP. You can see the group you have 
been assigned to in the top left corner of the game panel. 
 
This experiment is divided into two stages and you will see the corresponding 
instructions just before each stage. Now, you will see the instruction of the FIRST 
STAGE. In the first stage, you will be asked to make a choice in nine different tasks. 
These tasks have no correct answer but allow your preferences to be stated. You will 
be paid for each task in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). These units will be 
converted into dollars at the end of the experiment at the rate of $1 for every 
#exchange# units. 
 
In the experiment, there are three types of tasks. These three types are explained next 
in this instruction screen and a corresponding sample screen will appear on the game 
panel. 
 
One type is called the LOTTERY TASK. A lottery offers either of two prizes. These 
prizes are an amount of ECUs. One prize has certain probability (from 1% to 100%) 
and the other has the remaining probability to sum up to 100%. The final prize is 
drawn by the computer at the end of the experiment using the associated probabilities. 
 
In this type of tasks, you will be shown 5 lotteries and you must choose one of the 
lotteries by clicking on it. The selected lottery will become framed in yellow. No 
choice will be final until you click on the submit button. 
 
As an example, the game panel shows two lotteries. The lottery on the left offers 10 
ECU with 40% probability and 3 ECU with 60% probability. The lottery on the right 
offers 8 ECU with 50% probability and 6 ECU with 50% probability. In the actual 
experiment, the position of the lotteries will be randomly assigned every single time. 
 
To see how the lottery tasks work, select one of the two lotteries in the game panel, 
then click submit. 
 
Do this now. 
 
Another type is called the ALLOCATION TASK. In this type of tasks, you will be 
randomly matched with another person in this room. An allocation will indicate how 
to split certain amount of ECUs between you and that other person. The final 
allocation will be implemented at the end of the experiment. 
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In this type of tasks, you will be shown 5 allocations and you must choose one of the 
allocations by clicking on it. The selected allocation will become framed in yellow. 
No choice will be final until you click on the submit button. 
 
As an example, the game panel shows two allocations. The allocation on the left 
offers 10 ECU for yourself, and 5 for the other person. The allocation on the right 
offers 8 ECUs for yourself, and 8 for the other person. In the actual experiment, the 
position of the allocations will be randomly assigned every single time. 
 
To see how the allocation tasks work, select one of the two allocations in the game 
panel, then click submit.  
 
Do this now. 
 
The final type is called the LABEL TASK. A label is a just an option containing a 
word. The payment for each of these tasks is fixed and equal to #labelPay# ECUs. 
This amount will be also paid at the end of the experiment. No choice will be final 
until you click on the submit button. 
 
In this type of tasks, you will be shown 5 labels and you must choose of the labels by 
clicking on it. The selected label will become framed in yellow.  
 
As an example, the game panel shows two labels. The label on the left says “Left”, 
and the label on the right says “Right”. In the actual experiment, the position of the 
labels will be randomly assigned every single time. 
 
To see how the labels tasks work, select one of the two labels in the game panel, then 
click submit.  
 
Do this now. 
 
That is the end of the instruction for FIRST STAGE. If you have any doubt so far, 
please raise your hand. If not, you will proceed to the first stage by clicking the start 
button. Once you start if, at any time, you need to review the concrete instructions of 
any type, they will appear at the top of the screen in the corresponding task. 
 
Click on Start to being the experiment. 
 
 
SECOND STAGE 
 
That is the end of the FIRST STAGE. Now, you begin the SECOND STAGE of the 
experiment. 
 
The payment in this second stage will be calculated as before because the same type 
of tasks that you have seen in the first stage will be presented now. In fact, you will 
see each of the same tasks that you saw in the first stage five times more.  
 
[Treatment>0: In addition, you will also be provided specific information about the 
choices of other players.] 
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[Treatment=1: In particular, you will be informed of a choice made by members of 
YOUR #yourLabel# GROUP. This choice will be framed in #color# and it will be 
indicated by a message above the choice.] 
 
[Treatment=2: In particular, you will be informed of a choice made by members of 
the OTHER #theirLabel# GROUP. This choice will be framed in #theirColor# and it 
will be indicated by a message above the choice.] 
 
[Treatment=3: In particular, you will be informed of a choice made by members of 
YOUR #yourLabel# GROUP and the OTHER #theirLabel# GROUP. If they are 
different, each choice will be framed in #color# and #theirColor#, respectively. If they 
are the same, this choice will be framed in PURPLE. In both cases, a corresponding 
message above the choice will be presented.] 
 
[Treatment>0: Recall that your own group is indicated by the top left corner of the 
game panel.] 
 
Click on Start to continue the experiment. 
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Online Appendix [not intended for publication] 
 
B1. Further details on ordering of tasks. 
In order to create some variation in the order of the Decisions, we randomly drawn 
four orders in which the subjects would see the Decisions before the experiment. The 
realization of those orders is given in Table B1. For example, in version 1, subjects 
see Decision 3 first, Decision 7 second and so on. In each session, sets of 6 subjects 
were assigned randomly to one of these versions. 
 
Table B1: Decision by Version and Order 
 
Version 
Order 1 2 3 4 
1 3 6 5 7 
2 7 1 9 4 
3 2 8 3 6 
4 6 2 8 9 
5 4 9 7 3 
6 9 4 1 5 
7 8 7 6 2 
8 5 3 2 1 
9 1 5 4 8 
 
 
Figure B1: Screenshot of a Decision 
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Table B2: Following their own and others’ signal (OLS) 
 Follow own signal Follow other signal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Initial 0.365*** 0.245*** 0.320*** 0.269*** 
 (0.022) (0.040) (0.025) (0.049) 
     
Treatment 1 0.160*** 0.132*** -0.049*** -0.055*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.014) (0.013) 
     
Treatment 2 -0.023* -0.043*** 0.100*** 0.087*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) 
     
Treatment 3 0.100*** 0.077*** 0.024 0.015 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) 
     
Initial*Treatment 1  0.177***  0.045 
  (0.055)  (0.064) 
     
Initial*Treatment 2  0.137**  0.099 
  (0.064)  (0.076) 
     
Initial*Treatment 3  0.163**  0.067 
  (0.063)  (0.069) 
     
Lottery Type -0.021 -0.019 0.036*** 0.035*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) 
     
Dictator Type 0.002 0.003 0.040** 0.041** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) 
     
Ranked 0.022 0.021 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
     
Order 0.0006 0.0006 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Time2 0.012 0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Time3 -0.015 -0.015 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
     
Time4 -0.007 -0.007 0.006 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Time5 0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Constant 0.102*** 0.119*** 0.062*** 0.070*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observations 10,800 10,800 10,800 10,800 
Dep. variable: 1 if signal is followed in a given choice; 0 otherwise. The 
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B3: Following their own and others’ signal (OLS 1st choice) 
 Follow own signal Follow other signal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Initial 0.419*** 0.353*** 0.411*** 0.413*** 
 (0.031) (0.064) (0.031) (0.072) 
     
Treatment 1 0.170*** 0.152*** -0.053*** -0.043** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.019) (0.018) 
     
Treatment 2 -0.011 -0.027 0.059** 0.054** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) 
     
Treatment 3 0.128*** 0.122*** 0.013 0.009 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.025) (0.023) 
     
Initial*Treatment 1  0.110  -0.073 
  (0.088)  (0.088) 
     
Initial*Treatment 2  0.112  0.044 
  (0.082)  (0.097) 
     
Initial*Treatment 3  0.035  0.031 
  (0.098)  (0.095) 
     
Lottery Type -0.017 -0.018 0.043** 0.041** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020) 
     
Dictator Type 0.026 0.026 0.059*** 0.058*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022) 
     
Ranked 0.039* 0.039* -0.033* -0.033* 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) 
     
Order -0.0003 -0.0003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Constant 0.074*** 0.084*** 0.061** 0.063*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
Dep. variable: 1 if signal is followed in a given choice; 0 otherwise. Only the 
first choice in each Decision is included. The standard errors are clustered at 
the individual level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B4: Frequency individuals follow their own signal Treatment 1 
  Follow Signal 
Initial 0.893*** 
 
(0.085) 
Ranked Decision 0.067 
 
(0.114) 
Order 0.011 
 
(0.015) 
Lottery 0.009 
 
(0.105) 
Dictator 0.025 
 
(0.152) 
Follower 0.313** 
 
(0.147) 
Constant -0.018 
 (0.138) 
  
Observations 480 
 Number of subjects 60 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B5: Follow signal in Treatments 1 and 2 (OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Initial 0.340*** 0.391*** 0.463*** 
 (0.036) (0.0363) (0.0517) 
    
Treatment -0.017 -0.0169 -0.00378 
 (0.047) (0.0339) (0.0420) 
    
FollowerLabel -0.033   
 (0.100)   
    
Treat*FollowerLabel 0.212   
 (0.126)   
    
FollowerDictator  -0.0957  
  (0.0805)  
    
Treat*FollowerDictator  0.236**  
  (0.0942)  
    
FollowerLottery   -0.128 
   (0.114) 
    
Treat*FollowerLottery   0.279* 
   (0.143) 
    
Ranked Decisions -0.008 0.0149 0.0614** 
 (0.020) (0.0232) (0.0287) 
    
Order 0.007* -0.00286 -0.00286 
 (0.004) (0.00429) (0.00416) 
    
Female 0.045 0.0423 0.0164 
 (0.035) (0.0305) (0.0346) 
    
Time=2 -0.022 -0.0107 0.0117 
 (0.019) (0.0150) (0.0137) 
    
Time=3 0.001 0.0250 0.0267 
 (0.016) (0.0158) (0.0161) 
    
Time=4 0.029 0.0250 0.0300* 
 (0.019) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
    
Time=5 0.010 0.0321** 0.0400** 
 (0.019) (0.0153) (0.0158) 
    
Constant 0.161*** 0.163*** 0.151** 
 (0.043) (0.0367) (0.0473) 
Observations 3,600 4,200 3,000 
Dep. variable: 1 if signal is followed in a given choice; 0 
otherwise. The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the individual level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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FollowerLabel+ Treat*FollowerLabel=0: p-value = 0.0215 
FollowerDictator+ Treat*FollowerDictator=0: p-value = 0.0044 
FollowerLottery+ Treat*FollowerLottery=0: p-value = 0.0545 
 
 
Table B6: Classification of subjects according to different thresholds 
  
Cumulative distribution of the number 
of tasks in which a subjects is a follower 
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2 1 1 4 16 28 37 51 60 
3 0 0 2 5 12 26 40 60 
4 0 0 1 1 7 16 31 60 
5 0 0 0 1 3 10 23 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B7: Predicting Follower indeces 
 Follower
Label 
Follower
Dictator 
Follower
Lottery 
    
Risk averse 0.021 0.057  
 (0.023) (0.035)  
    
Selfish 0.018  0.016 
 (0.020)  (0.013) 
    
Female 0.099* -0.058 0.036 
 (0.043) (0.064) (0.037) 
    
Constant 0.033 0.082 0.181*** 
 (0.132) (0.129) (0.029) 
Observations 120 120 120 
Dep. variable: Frequency being classified as follower in each 
task in treatments with own signal (T1 and T3). Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Further summary statistics 
 
Results from Stage 1 by Treatment 
Table B8: Distribution of choices in Treatment 0 by Decision 
Decision Options as shown in Table 1 
1 38.33 15.00 10.00 3.33 33.33 
2 13.33 13.33 11.67 16.67 45.00 
3 28.33 23.33 20.00 18.33 10.00 
4 41.67 13.33 15.00 15.00 15.00 
5 46.67 11.67 13.33 5.00 23.33 
6 11.67 28.33 10.00 25.00 25.00 
7 13.33 10.00 20.00 21.67 35.00 
8 20.00 5.00 15.00 13.33 46.67 
9 8.33 10.00 13.33 11.67 56.67 
 
 
Table B9: Distribution of choices in Treatment 1 by Decision 
Decision Options as shown in Table 1 
1 16.67 20.00 16.67 8.33 38.33 
2 16.67 18.33 13.33 20.00 31.67 
3 16.67 41.67 13.33 15.00 13.33 
4 35.00 16.67 8.33 26.67 13.33 
5 35.00 8.33 11.67 15.00 30.00 
6 8.33 18.33 11.67 28.33 33.33 
7 5.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 35.00 
8 13.33 13.33 10.00 16.67 46.67 
9 10.00 10.00 8.33 8.33 63.33 
 
 
Table B10: Distribution of choices in Treatment 2 by Decision 
Decision Options as shown in Table 1 
1 45.00 16.67 10.00 1.67 26.67 
2 13.33 11.67 16.67 18.33 40.00 
3 30.00 25.00 21.67 16.67 6.67 
4 41.67 18.33 15.00 20.00 5.00 
5 55.00 6.67 11.67 13.33 13.33 
6 11.67 11.67 13.33 36.67 26.67 
7 15.00 10.00 21.67 23.33 30.00 
8 18.33 3.33 8.33 16.67 53.33 
9 8.33 5.00 15.00 13.33 58.33 
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Table B11: Distribution of choices in Treatment 3 by Decision 
Decision Options as shown in Table 1 
1 33.33 21.67 15.00 3.33 26.67 
2 16.67 23.33 21.67 11.67 26.67 
3 16.67 33.33 16.67 15.00 18.33 
4 53.33 11.67 5.00 21.67 8.33 
5 55.00 8.33 15.00 6.67 15.00 
6 5.00 20.00 16.67 40.00 18.33 
7 21.67 3.33 13.33 41.67 20.00 
8 18.33 8.33 6.67 16.67 50.00 
9 6.67 5.00 11.67 13.33 63.33 
 
 
Results from Stage 2 by Treatment 
Table B12: Distribution of choices in Treatment 0 by Decision 
Decision Options as shown in Table 1 
1 37.67 18.00 12.00 9.33 23.00 
2 16.00 15.00 17.00 13.67 38.33 
3 26.67 25.00 15.33 19.33 13.67 
4 42.67 20.00 11.67 14.67 11.00 
5 47.33 14.67 10.00 8.00 20.00 
6 16.67 17.00 20.33 32.33 13.67 
7 22.67 14.00 23.67 20.67 19.00 
8 24.00 10.00 8.33 14.33 43.33 
9 13.67 7.33 15.00 14.33 49.67 
 
 
Table B13: Distribution of choices in Treatment 1 by Decision 
Decision Options as shown in Table 1 
1 19.00 18.33 17.67 11.67 33.33 
2 14.33 25.67 15.33 23.33 21.33 
3 16.00 25.00 22.67 13.67 22.67 
4 32.00 18.67 14.00 15.33 20.00 
5 35.00 15.33 7.67 7.67 34.33 
6 14.33 17.00 15.33 26.33 27.00 
7 7.67 17.33 20.67 24.33 30.00 
8 7.67 15.33 14.67 21.67 40.67 
9 8.00 11.33 10.67 27.00 43.00 
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Table B14: Distribution of choices in Treatment 2 by Decision 
Decision Options as shown in Table 1 
1 33.67 15.00 13.33 11.00 27.00 
2 13.33 13.67 15.00 21.00 37.00 
3 30.00 22.67 21.33 10.67 15.33 
4 39.67 21.00 10.00 15.00 14.33 
5 47.33 13.67 9.33 9.67 20.00 
6 12.33 19.33 15.67 30.33 22.33 
7 7.67 22.33 21.67 20.33 28.00 
8 19.33 12.67 13.33 23.33 31.33 
9 15.33 6.67 8.33 20.67 49.00 
 
 
Table B15: Distribution of choices in Treatment 3 by Decision 
Decision Options as shown in Table 1 
1 26.33 20.33 16.00 13.33 24.00 
2 12.33 26.67 16.67 16.67 27.67 
3 23.33 27.33 16.67 10.00 22.67 
4 39.33 29.33 7.00 8.33 16.00 
5 39.67 25.67 5.67 8.33 20.67 
6 18.00 25.33 12.67 27.67 16.33 
7 11.67 17.67 23.00 23.67 24.00 
8 14.00 12.33 4.67 25.00 44.00 
9 14.67 3.33 3.67 28.67 49.67 
 
 
Table B16: Percentage of subjects who chose one choice in Stage 2 consistent with 
Stage 1 by Treatment and Decision 
Decision 
Treatment 
0 1 2 3 
1 5.00 16.67 5.00 6.67 
2 11.67 11.67 20.00 25.00 
3 16.67 10.00 13.33 15.00 
4 15.00 20.00 13.33 11.67 
5 18.33 25.00 11.67 16.67 
6 21.67 28.33 21.67 10.00 
7 25.00 23.33 18.33 6.67 
8 6.67 16.67 6.67 11.67 
9 15.00 8.33 13.33 6.67 
 
